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Abstract 
There is growing controversy on the HR consequences of private equity acquisitions, 
especially where the existing management team is replaced. Much of the debate, thus 
far, has centred on the use of limited panels of case studies and industry surveys. This 
paper, in contrast, uses both in-depth interviews with relevant stakeholders and 
objective company data to compare firms subject to private equity acquisitions against a 
control group of non-acquired firms. Our interviews provide insights into key issues that 
are investigated in the subsequent empirical analysis. Our core findings are that firms 
subject to a specific type of private equity acquisition ± Institutional Buy-Outs - are 
associated with job losses, lower wages and lower productivity. This evidence is 
consistent with the notion that this type of private equity acquisition has negative 
employment consequences without any corresponding improvement in productivity. 
 
Keywords: private equity; acquisitions; employment; productivity; downsizing.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of the implications of private equity takeovers on employment, 
productivity and wages, looking specifically at the case of institutional buy-outs (IBOs). 
In recent years there has been increasing controversy surrounding the role of private 
equity acquisitions, specifically in terms of their effect on workers in the target 
organizations. To its proponents, the private equity industry provides new sources of 
funding and also helps to solve the agency problem via the reversal of value-destroying 
³empire building´ by managers and, by doing so, disciplines and reenergises the 
remaining employees (Jensen, 2007). In contrast, critics argue that private equity 
acquisitions represent the ultimate expression of predatory financialized capital 
(Folkman et al., 2007), focusing on the short-term maximisation of shareholder wealth 
without any consideration for the interests of other stakeholders, specifically employees.  
Not only is private equity a diverse phenomenon, but the evidence base for existing 
debates is also very diverse. Many existing studies rely on case studies (Froud and 
Williams, 2007a and 2007b) while others utilise surveys of representatives of the 
industry (see, for example, Bacon et al., 2004). In contrast, this study uses  company 
annual reports from a sample of acquired firms both before and after the acquisition, 
compared against a control group of non-acquired firms.  While there is much 
discussion as to the relative superiority of company data over subjective perceptions, 
with some accounts suggesting that the results are broadly comparable, and indeed 
interchangeable (Dess and Robinson, 1984), others have argued that industry surveys 
are less reliable as managers are likely to overstate performance and downplay 
limitations in order not to draw attention to any failings on their behalf (Bjorkman and 
3 
 
Budhwar, 2007; Razouk, 2011).  Although of course, with any auditable document there 
is a possibility of fraud, formal accounts detailing organizational performance and key 
organizational statistics such as size are likely to be broadly comparable within the 
same context, shedding light on objective trends within the organization.  Indeed, 
Subramanian et al. (1993) found, that within the same national context, whilst better 
performing firms used stronger language in their reports, the broad nature of 
communication and factual content were comparable. ,QXVLQJFRPSDQLHV¶UHSRUWVWKLV
article concentrates on the quantitative data provided, hence avoiding any difficulties 
that may be associated with the narratives provided.  Although industry surveys may, in 
turn, yield more detailed data than is possible to be extracted via company reports, it 
can be argued that, in an industry as controversial as private equity, the use of 
externally auditable data has considerable value, not least as it has been subject to 
verification by the statutory audit process. A key distinguishing feature of this study, 
therefore, is the use of financial information that has been subject to an external audit. 
The use of a control sample is crucial in order to control for the possibility that any 
findings emerging may simply mirror broader trends across the economy or that private 
equity acquirers specifically target firms with particular sets of characteristics, who, in 
the absence of a takeover, are likely to have encountered financial difficulties anyway.  
The study adds to earlier work of the authors in that it focuses in more depth on the 
relationship between takeovers, jobs and wages, as well as deploying different 
econometric methods. In addition to this quantitative dimension, the study is 
supplemented by interviews with key stakeholders interested in the employment 
consequences of private equity acquisitions. The ability to combine both qualitative and 
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quantitative research methods in the study allows us to capture a richer understanding 
of employee issues surrounding private equity acquisitions as well as facilitating a more 
balanced and objective appraisal of the empirical findings. Conducting interviews 
enables us to confirm whether our main research question, i.e. whether IBOs are more 
likely to have detrimental effects on employment than other types of private equity 
transactions, is appropriate. It also enables us to identify secondary factors that may 
influence the employment effects and that need to be controlled for in the quantitative 
analysis.  However, in addition to simply corroborating evidence, the use of more than 
one method serves a purpose of providing complementary evidence (Gill and Johnson, 
2010:225): the interviews shed further light on the diversity of the sector and possible 
differences in rationales and strategies around buy-outs.    
This paper is structured as follows. We start with a brief conceptualisation of private 
equity and then present a summary of the underlying arguments offered in support and 
in opposition of private equity investment. We then discuss the findings from in-depth 
interviews which provide the motivation for, and additional insights into, the subsequent 
quantitative analysis. This is followed by a discussion of our quantitative findings.  We 
then discuss the practical implications of our findings and in the final section we present 
our conclusions and map out an agenda for future research. 
 
CONCEPTUALISING PRIVATE EQUITY  
Private equity UDLVHV³FDSLWDOIRUFORVHGHQGIXQGVRUJDQLVHGDVOLPLWHGSDUWQHUVKLSVZLWK
clearly defined investment strategies, restrictive covenants setting out each investor¶s 
rights and responsibilities, and 10±13 year lock-XSSHULRGV´ (Cumming et al., 2011: 2). 
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Wright and Wood (2009) argue that private equity encompasses different investor 
categories, which in turn, may lead to distinct outcomes. Private equity acquisitions are 
typically subdivided into management buy-outs (MBOs), management buy-ins (MBIs) 
and institutional buy-outs (IBOs). In MBOs, incumbent managers take the firm private, 
UHWDLQLQJ WKHLU UROH EXW W\SLFDOO\ HQG XS RZQLQJ D VLJQLILFDQW SURSRUWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V
equity (Wright and Wood, 2009). Additional finance is normally provided in the form of 
substantial levels of debt. In contrast, MBIs consist of a new management team taking 
the firm private, often assisted by private equity houses. Finally, IBOs are private equity 
acquisitions undertaken by specialist investors or investment banks, typically involving a 
change of management. The IBO management team does not own significant equity 
once the acquisition is completed.  
What distinguishes private equity from venture capital is that the former tends to target 
more mature firms whereas the latter provides capital for early stage business ventures 
(Wright et al., 2009). The focus of this study is exclusively on IBOs since the change of 
management, a key characteristic of such acquisitions, is most likely to be associated 
with significant employment changes. There are two reasons why this would be the 
case. The first is that, as outsiders, it is easier for incoming managers to break implicit 
contracts with workers (Shleifer and Summers, 1988; Jensen, 2000). Second, it is 
expected that it is more difficult for outside managers to accurately gauge and value the 
worth of DQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VKXPDQDVVHWVDQGWKHLUFRPELQHGDQGLQGLYLGXDOFDSDELOLWLHV
(Goergen et al. 2011; Aoki 2010).   
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THE CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATE EQUITY TAKEOVERS: DEBATES AND 
CONTROVERSIES 
As Ernst et al. (2013) note, proponents of private equity see it as a superior ownership 
model opening up new routes for alternative sources of capital. Furthermore, without 
having to be concerned with stock prices, owners can adopt a longer term perspective. 
Lower levels of investment following a private equity takeover may reflect greater 
possibilities for leveraging and fewer information asymmetries between managers and 
investors while increased debt may disFRXUDJH³XQQHFHVVDU\´ LQYHVWPHQW(UQVWet al., 
2013: 188). Whilst there is some evidence to suggest that the performance of many 
private equity funds is relatively poor, it can be argued that, without the active 
management role played by private equity investors, the performance of affected firms 
may have been even worse (Nielsen, 2011). 
Baker and Anderson (2010) argue that private equity provides an effective solution to 
the agency problem by ensuring managers act in the interests of owners, focusing on 
profits rather than being distracted by other agendas. According to Jensen (2000: 11), 
SULYDWH HTXLW\ SURYLGHV DQ ³HDUO\ ZDUQLQJ V\VWHP´ HQFRXUDJLQJ ILUPV WR HPEDUN RQ
³KHDOWK\´ VL]H DGMXVWPHQWV RI WKH ZRUNIRUFH UHYHUVLQJ D KLVWRULFDO WHQGHQF\ WRZDUGV
excess capacity, brought about not only by changes in demand but also changes in 
WHFKQRORJ\2ZLQJWRWKHORVVRISUHVWLJHIROORZLQJRQIURPWKHUHYHUVDORIWKHLU³HPSLUH
EXLOGLQJ´PDQDJHUVDUHOLNHO\WRUHVLVWGRZQVL]LQJ,QGHHGLWPD\EHGLIILFXOWIRUWKHm to 
objectively recognize that their firm is a high cost operator. Their replacement by a new 
managerial team following a private equity takeover is likely to bring greater objectivity 
to the process (Jensen, 2007).  
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Wright et al. (2009) argue that private equity is indeed efficient in terms of reducing 
agency problems and enhancing cash flow; however, this account recognizes that there 
is much diversity within the sector. Again, it could be argued that private equity may 
target over-diversified firms, encouraging a narrowing of focus and a much needed 
specialization. Bacon et al. (2010) argue that employees may also benefit from reduced 
agency costs. They argue that, as managers are deterred from excessive and 
potentially unsustainable empire building, existing employees may be more secure in 
their jobs, even if this means that fewer new positions are created.  
In contrast, Folkman et al. (2007) argue that the rise of private equity represents a 
component of a broader phenomenon ± the increased prominence of financial 
intermediaries. The latter bring to bear an instrumentalist approach which views target 
organizations as stores of value waiting to be released. Such investors have less 
concern with actual returns in terms of sales and revenue and more with value release 
³K\SHULQQRYDWLRQ´WKURXJKVHOOLQJRIIDVVHWVDQGWDNLQJRQH[FHVVLYHGHEW)RONPDQHW
al. 2007: 554). In other words, rather than reining in managerial excess, private equity 
takeovers benefit intermediaries at the expense of those with a stake in the long term 
prosperity of the firm.  Westcott (2009: 533) argues that, when private equity borrows to 
fund a takeover, the affected firm bears the debt, exposing it to risk in the event of 
changes in interest rates. Hence, both existing shareholders and other stakeholders in 
the firm may lose out from a private equity takeover.    
Clark (2013: 145) argues that such takeovers are often associated with redundancies 
and employee transfers, the downgrading of information sharing and consultation, and 
union de-recognition. In reality, although not all takeovers adopt all aspects of this 
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template, a common pattern is towards decisive and far reaching restructuring, 
negatively impacting both managers and workers (Clark 2013). Although, for example, 
de-unionization may be difficult to implement, private equity fund practitioners 
interviewed by Clark (2013: 152) found a general hostility to extending union rights and 
a preference for more contingent terms and conditions of employment. In turn, the 
primary agenda appears to be towards enhancing fund performance, rather than 
organizational efficiency (ibid.). Ernst et al. (2013) argue that private equity harms the 
economy through paying more for target firms than other more patient investors would 
have since the primary focus is on the liquidation of assets, and in doing so sacrifices 
employees on the altar of short-term profits (Ernst et al., 2013: 181). More specifically, 
Clark (2007) argues that private equity takeovers are more likely to incentivise 
managers to act like owners (Clark, 2007: 225) while high debt places pressure on firms 
to outsource and to extract more value by harder human resource policies, based on 
examples such as the AA, Birds Eye and NCP. Pensions may be used as collateral for 
debts incurred by acquisitions, with deficits in pensions being met by further debt 
(Clarke, 2009). The pursuit of high returns makes low road HR policies attractive (Clark, 
2007: 223); whilst this does not always result in immediate job shedding, the pace of the 
latter may be accelerated under a private equity takeover.  
Not all the literature that notes such effects on HR policy is critical of the industry. For 
example, Jensen (2000) argues that an active market for corporate control is a highly 
effective force in disciplining wasteful managerial behaviour, including overstaffing.  
However, Appelbaum (2013: 17) sees the resultant breaking of implicit contracts as 
having negative consequences for organizational sustainability. As no employment 
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contract can ever be complete, implicit contracts represent a cost effective way of 
encouraging employees to perform productively, and, hence, reneging on them may 
UXLQD ILUP¶VFDSDFLW\ WRVWD\RSHUDWLQJ WKURXJKHIIHFWLYHFRQWUDFWLQJZLWKVWDNHKROGHUV
(ibid.: 17). In the case of IBOs, it can be argued that managers will be particularly 
complicit in breaches of trust and the damage to implicit contracts particularly severe.  
In interviews with private equity funds, Clark (2013: 150) found that they tended to view 
performance outcomes primarily in terms of their investment portfolio and not the firm 
itself, leading to a somewhat instrumental view to other organizational stakeholders.   
As can be seen from the above, a concern of a significant component of the UK 
literature has been on whether private equity builds value or simply redistributes it at the 
expense of employees, and potentially the firm itself. However, it would be incorrect to 
assume that all evidence falls neatly into either an optimistic or pessimistic camp. A 
further area of debate is whether private equity takeovers (for either the right or wrong 
reasons) inevitably leave employees worse off, or if they can potentially lead to mutual 
gains for both employers and employees. Secondly, although this study deals only with 
IBOs, there is a considerable body of empirical evidence that suggests that the work 
and employment consequences of other types of private equity funded takeover ± most 
notably MBOs ± may be more beneficial for employees (Wood and Wright, 2009; 
Cumming et al., 2007; Amess and Wright, 2007). General studies that combine differing 
manifestations of this complex phenomenon have yielded diverse results (Wood and 
Wright, 2009). The closest comparable study to this one ± but based on US data ± is 
Davis et al. (2011) that reported a diversity in outcomes, with the worst results for 
employment encountered in the service and retail sector. The overall effects on 
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employment were found to be modest, with the main consequence being the 
reallocation of jobs between establishments in target firms (ibid.). At the same time, they 
found that public to private transactions involved large job losses at targets, in contrast 
to private equity takeovers of independent firms, i.e. private to private transactions, 
which yielded converse results (Davis et al. 2011: 30-31). 
 
INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
In order to understand more fully the issue at hand we decided to precede our 
quantitative analysis by a limited number of interviews with interested stakeholders. The 
aim of the interviews was to help contextualize the study and shed further light on the 
key issues at stake. We undertook four comprehensive interviews in 2008/9 with two 
trade union representatives, a representative from an independent research centre and 
a representative from the private equity industry. Further details on the respondents are 
provided at the close of this paper: interviewees were approached, the aims of the study 
outlined, its quantitative component explained, and informed consent sought. A 
standardized open ended interview schedule was employed, a copy of which is 
available from the authors. Three of the respondents were acknowledged critics of the 
industry, and, hence, it must be recognized that the balance of the interviews is tilted 
WRZDUGVWKHLQGXVWU\¶V critics. However, several prominent players in the industry were 
approached and refused to be interviewed: non-participation may reflect respondents 
being ill at ease with the VWXG\¶VFHQWUDOFRQFHUQVRUREMHFWLYHVRUEHing uncomfortable 
in expressing an opinion on a particular area (Kumar 2010: 140). Here, it should be 
reiterated that the interviews do not aim to provide a representative view of the full 
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range of alternative perspectives, but only to gain additional illumination or insights to 
shed further light on the principal, quantitative research findings: interviews are 
supplementary to the core quantitative component and the former serve for illustrative 
purposes and do not constitute a part of a fully-fledged triangulation of data. At the 
same time, we acknowledge that a more complete multi-method approach bringing to 
bear survey findings, company data and interviews would yield very much more 
nuanced insights. That, however, goes beyond the scope of a single journal article.  
From a trade union perspective, private equity has often been associated with the 
adoption of very hardline policies against employees (Ludkin, 2008). However, there is 
a great deal of diversity within the private equity sector. It is recognized that private-
equity backed MBOs are very different in terms of consequences for employees than 
IBOs (Ludkin, ,QWKHFDVHRI0%2VWKRVHLQYROYHGPD\EH³SDVVLRQDWHDERXWWKH
company, more likely to support it « PRUH OLNHO\ WR EH VXVWDLQDEOH´ /XGNLQ, 2008). 
³9HQWXUHFDSLWDO LVPRUHDVVociated with job creation, long termism; private equity with 
PRUHIOLSSLQJDEXVLYHEHKDYLRXU´/XGNLQ, 2008).  
In contrast, in the case of IBOs, there is much less interest in sustainability, and hence 
in higher value added human resource management (HRM) policies, and in the 
wellbeing of employees themselves (Ludkin, 2008). As another union representative 
QRWHG³LW LV,%2VWKDWXQLRQVKDYHEHHQPRVWFRQFHUQHGDERXW´ (Williamson, 2009). In 
some cases, such as in the East Anglian agricultural sector, IBOs have spearheaded 
cuts in wages and working conditions, which other players have mimicked (Ludkin, 
2008). The LQGXVWU\ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH IHOW WKDW ³WKHSURSRUWLRQRI0%2V LVJHWWLQJVPDOOHU
and smaller, meaning that IBOs are becoming proportionately more imporWDQW´ 
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The industry representative felt that there was no reason in principle why firms should 
automatically get rid of employees, and, the principal opportunity identified by private 
equity investors was the fact that companies in this area were historically undervalued. 
Again, there is little evidence that employees in private equity owned companies are 
better or worse off than others. It could be argued that private equity often targets 
companies that are already in distress, so that adverse HR consequences are 
inevitable. It was generally felt that it was more difficult to renege on implicit contracts in 
the case of MBOs since the incumbent managers staying in place would have a closer 
understanding as to the precise nature of implicit contracts and the greater transaction 
costs should the latter be arbitrarily jettisoned. The interviewees were divided as to the 
nature and extent of this process in the case of IBOs. The industry interviewee felt that 
WKHUHZDVQRFOHDUSDWWHUQLQWKLVUHJDUG³HYHU\GHDOis different in terms of the life cycle 
RI WKH WUDQVDFWLRQDQG UHVXOWDQWPDQDJHULDOSUDFWLFHV´ Both union representatives felt 
that, in the case of IBOs, incoming management would have very little interest in such 
implicit contracts and would readily jettison them if need be. As Williamson (2009) 
DUJXHG³there are often trade union concerns of (the effects of) new managers. There is 
a basic question of employment relations issues, as what is in place may be swept 
DZD\´ This would reflect a primary focus on formal written rules, and the extent to 
which they may enable or constrain a release of value to owners, and a general 
discounting of the role and value of informal rules and norms.  
Both union representatives were of the opinion that, in the case of IBOs, a strong 
HPSKDVLV ZRXOG EH RQ ³VTXHH]LQJ´ ODERXU WKURXJK OHDQHU VWDIILQJ DQG KHQFH WKH
intensification of work, with discipline being enforced through weaker job security. 
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Furthermore ³LIRUJDQL]DWLRQVDUH LQGHEW IRUPDQ\\HDUV WKLVFRXOGQHJDWLYely impact 
RQ WKHLU IXWXUH FDSDFLW\ WR UHLQYHVW LQ SHRSOH RU RWKHUZLVH´ :LOOLDPVRQ, 2009). The 
LQGXVWU\VSRNHVSHUVRQIHOW³WKHJRDOLVWRJHQHUDWHUHWXUQV; if sectors can benefit, there 
LV QR UHDVRQ WR JHW ULG RI HPSOR\HHV ZLWKRXW JRRG UHDVRQ´ In contrast, a union 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHDUJXHG³WKHHQWU\RI3(SOD\HUVKDVOHGWRGRZQZDUGSUHVVXUHRQZDJHV
mimicking of wage cutting is worse when there are limited alternative employment 
choices, so the effects are worse on the periphery. There is a rise of short-termism and 
JUHHGOHVVRQEXLOGLQJ´/XGNLQ, 2008).  
The interviews summarised above were designed to obtain more of a narrative insight 
into the thoughts of interested stakeholders regarding the expected/actual impact of 
private equity acquisitions on employees and, in so doing, to complement our empirical 
analysis. While some of the views are general and do not discriminate between different 
types of private equity acquisitions, a number of interesting views emerge that relate 
both to the underlying literature discussed earlier as well as the more focused results of 
our empirical analysis. First, there seems to be awareness among interviewees that not 
all private equity takeovers are equally threatening to employees with a recognition that 
MBOs may actually be positive (Bacon et al., 2008, 2010). The interviews reported here 
as well as prior research confirms the appropriateness of our focus on IBOs as they 
have the potential for more adverse employment consequences. 
Second, our interviews also highlight the need to employ appropriate controls in our 
analysis. Specifically, our interviewees highlighted the need to control for industry 
differences since the impact of private equity acquisitions may depend on industry. Our 
interviews, as well as prior empirical studies, also highlight the need to control for pre-
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acquisition performance to ensure that employment effects are not due to weaker prior 
performance and, therefore, would be likely to have occurred with or without private 
equity intervention. In our empirical analysis, therefore, we use industry dummies and 
we also employ a sample of non-acquired firms matched with each acquired firm in 
terms of prior performance to ensure that any identified effects are due to the 
acquisition. Matching the acquired firms both by performance and industry would not 
have been feasible as some industries have very few firms and survivorship may also 
be a problem making it difficult to find appropriate non-acquired firms. 
 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Our initial sample consists of the 106 UK IBOs completed between 1997 and 2006. The 
choice of period of study implies that most of our sample (and control) firms were 
shielded from the negative effects of the 2007/8 crisis. In other words, the global 
economic conditions were more benign, or in varieties of capitalism language stable, 
during most of our period of study than they have been in more recent years. This would 
suggest that, if we find detrimental effects to employment in the target firms which 
cannot be explained by lower productivity or higher wage costs, these effects are likely 
to have been even more severe post financial crisis. There were two peaks during our 
period of study: 1998/99 with 31 acquisitions and 2005/6 with 40 acquisitions. Data on 
the number of employees, turnover and wage costs are obtained from the company 
accounts and are collected for the six years preceding the year of the acquisition as well 
as the four years following that year. In what follows we refer to years preceding the 
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acquisition year by negative numbers, e.g. year -1, and to years following the 
acquisition by positive numbers, e.g. year 3. 
To ensure that any observed downsizing is due to the private equity acquisition and not 
to market wide phenomena, we compare the target firms to control firms that are not 
acquired. The control firms are obtained by matching each target firm with a non-
acquired firm with the same performance in year -1 (or year -2 if data for year -1 are not 
available) and surviving until year 2 at least. Our measure of performance is earnings 
before interest and tax (EBIT) divided by turnover. Except for one firm, all of the target 
firms can be matched with a non-acquired firm with the same performance in year -1. 
Hence, our final sample is reduced to 105 IBO targets and 105 non-acquired control 
firms. 
The focus in this section is on whether there is a decrease in employment in the targets 
of IBOs, after adjusting for differences in wage costs and differences in productivity 
between the target firms and the control firms. Our regression analysis is broadly based 
on the labour demand model of Nickell (1984). The model is based on companies that 
are subject to quadratic cost functions and Cobb-Douglas type technologies as well as 
output constraints. The demand for employment model can be expressed as follows: 
ittitiittiittiit QQwwDD HIMGGEED   1,211,211,   (1) 
where Dit, wit, and Qit, are the demand for labour (measured by the logarithm ofthe 
number of employees), the logarithm of real wages relative to the user cost of capital 
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and the logarithm of real output over value added, respectively; ĳi, øt, and İit are 
unobserved, firm fixed effects, time-specific effects and an error term, respectively.1  
As our focus is on the downsizing of the workforce, rather than the actual demand for 
employment as specified in equation (1), we estimate the equivalent logistic regression 
whose dependent variable is set to one if there is downsizing in a given year, and zero 
otherwise.2 The independent variables in the logit are as in equation (1), except for the 
lagged dependent variable which is omitted given that the dependent variable (i.e. the 
drop in employment) is derived in part from the latter.  
We include up to three indicator variables in the logit regressions which are as follows. 
The first indicator variable is Acquired Firm. This variable is set to one if the observation 
relates to a target firm, and is zero otherwise. It picks up any long-term trend in 
employment in the target firms which occurs independent of the acquisition. The second 
indicator variable is Post Acquisition. This variable is set to one for the post acquisition 
years for both acquired firms and matched firms, and equals zero otherwise. This 
variable captures a possible market-wide trend in employment during years 1 to 4 which 
applies to both acquired firms and matched firms. Such a trend includes a downturn in 
the economy which would affect firms across the board, whether they have been the 
target of a private equity acquisition or not. Finally, the third indicator variable is our key 
variable. It is the interaction of the previous two indicator variables. It measures a 
possible employment effect which is limited to the target firms in the post-acquisition 
period. If this third variable is significant and negative, then there is evidence of a 
reduction in employment in the target firms post-acquisition which is not observed for 
the control firms and which cannot merely be explained by wage and productivity 
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differentials. We also include industry dummies as well as year dummies in the logit 
regressions. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the dichotomous dependent variable as well 
as the continuous independent variables. Panel A focuses on the 105 acquired firms; 
Panel B focuses on the 105 control firms. There are no significant differences between 
the proportion of acquired firms that downsize their workforce and the equivalent 
proportion for the control firms during the pre-acquisition period. However, there are 
significantly more firms among the acquired firms (0.59) that shed their workforce in 
year 1 than among the control firms (0.32). The difference in proportions is significant at 
the 1% level. 
Table 1 about here 
While the existing literature argues that one of the reasons for private equity 
acquisitions is to reduce excessive labour costs there is very little evidence of workers 
in target firms earning wages above the market rate pre-acquisition. Indeed, for none of 
the years during the pre-acquisition period are the average and median wage levels in 
the target firms statistically different from those in the control firms. However, during the 
post-acquisition period there is evidence of a drop in mean and median wages in the 
acquired firms. The differences in wage means and medians are significant at the 10% 
level in year 2 and at the 5% level in years 3 and 4. 
As to turnover over employees, our measure of labour productivity, except for the 
averages in years -5 to -3, the non-acquired firms are always significantly more 
productive (at the 5% level or better) than the acquired firms during the pre-acquisition 
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period. However, the significantly lower productivity of the target firms persists after the 
acquisition. Except for average productivity in year 1, productivity is always significantly 
lower (at the 10% level or better) in the acquired firms. 
Table 1 suggests that it is important to adjust for differences in both labour costs and 
productivity when assessing the employment effects of private equity acquisitions. 
Hence, our approach of estimating logistic regressions based on a labour demand 
model seems justified. Table 2 contains the results from the estimation of the logits. We 
ran four regressions; the way they differ from each other is in terms of how many of the 
above three indicator variables they include. In detail, regression (1) includes only the 
Acquired Firm indicator variable, regression (2) includes the same indicator variable as 
well as the Post Acquisition indicator variable, regression (3) includes all three indicator 
variables and regression (4) includes the Acquired Firm indicator variable as well as the 
interaction of the former with the Post Acquisition indicator.  
Table 2 about here 
Overall, the logit regressions perform well as all four continuous variables ± 
contemporaneous wage costs and productivity as well as their lags ± have the correct 
signs and are highly significant. The Wald Chi2 is also highly significant, suggesting that 
the logit regression as a whole has explanatory power. The coefficient on the Acquired 
Firm indicator variable is not significant in any of the three regressions, suggesting that 
there is no evidence of downsizing in employment in the target firms which occurred 
irrespective of the acquisition. The Post Acquisition indicator variable (see regression 
(2)) is significant at the 10% level only. However, when the interaction between Post 
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Acquisition and Acquired Firm is also included (see regression (3)) the Post Acquisition 
indicator variable is no longer significant whereas the interaction term is positive at the 
5% level. Finally, when the Post Acquisition indicator is dropped (see regression (4)) the 
significance of the interactive term increases to 1%. This suggests that there is 
downsizing in the target firms subsequent to their acquisition which cannot merely be 
explained by differences in wage costs and productivity while there is no conclusive 
evidence that there is market-wide downsizing in both the target firms and control firms 
during the post-acquisition period.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE 
The findings of this research suggest that specific types of private equity acquisitions ± 
IBOs ± are indeed detrimental to employment in the acquired firms. There is clear 
evidence of initial job losses after the acquisition but no evidence of increased efficiency 
or productivity by those employees who remain. These findings imply that private equity 
investors need to think more carefully about how best to maximise their wealth from 
taking firms private, with a particular need to think beyond just cost-cutting. 
Furthermore, these findings suggest that cutting employment levels, per se, also 
eliminates significant amounts of the accumulated knowledge and combined synergies 
that arise from people working together in the acquired firms, resulting in the lack of any 
evidence of post-acquisition improvement in performance. This, again, is something for 
private equity investors to carefully reflect on when considering such acquisitions. HR 
managers are likely, in the target organization, to be faced with the unenviable task of 
managing job cutting, and dealing with the knock-on consequences, ranging from the 
survivor syndrome to losses of expertise and capabilities. Finally, trade unionists and 
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politicians are right to be concerned about the employment consequences of private 
equity acquisitions as the overriding finding from this study is that IBOs are associated 
with negative employment consequences.   
CONCLUSIONS 
This study explored the effects of IBOs on employment, wages and productivity. We find 
strong evidence of a higher incidence of downsizing in IBO targets in the year following 
their acquisition: this would confirm the view that at the very least such takeovers 
accelerate any tendency to downsize. When we adjust for differences in wage costs and 
differences in productivity the strong evidence of a higher likelihood of downsizing in 
target firms persists. Interestingly, we find evidence of lower labour costs in the target 
firms pre-acquisition, which persists post-acquisition, where, again, lower productivity is 
encountered vis-à-vis the control group; this would suggest that incoming managers 
neglect the human dimension, other than in terms of controlling costs. Again, this would 
highlight a prioritization of fund returns over HR issues, even if neglecting the latter 
might undermine long-term organizational sustainability. The lack of attention to 
enhancing productivity might suggest that the priorities of incoming managers lie 
elsewhere, such as, for example, financial re-engineering, and that HR issues may be of 
only secondary concern to enhancing returns through non-HR interventions such as the 
liquidation of assets or the servicing of the debt. Although there is little sign that the 
financial crisis has run its course, the immediate consequences have been to further 
favour owners of highly fungible assets over those with capital or human capabilities 
tied up with a particular organization or industry (Wood and Lane, 2012). Hence, it is 
possible that the more negative consequences of IBOs may be accentuated. Here, a 
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caveat is in order; this study is of IBOs only. Studies of private equity backed MBOs 
suggest rather more positive results for employees (Wood and Wright, 2009); the 
industry is a diverse one and with similar diversity in outcomes possible.  
Given that our study provides new, objective quantitative data on the impact of IBOs on 
employment in the UK we hope it helps stimulate further research in this contentious 
area. In particular, it would be really interesting to extend this analysis to other countries 
to see whether similar effects apply. We are also conscious that, while we follow 
acquired firms for four years after the acquisition, it is possible that the downsizing we 
document may actually improve productivity further down the line. However, our 
experience also suggests that it is difficult to address this completely due to the attrition 
of both target and control firms over time, and our interviewees were mostly sceptical as 
to such a possibility. 
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Notes 
 
1In line with Conyon et al. (2001) real output over value added is proxied by real 
turnover given that the former is typically not available from the company accounts. In 
addition, Conyon et al. (2001) set the user cost of capital equal to one for each firm 
given the inherent problems with estimating this variable across firms. We do the 
same. Finally, we divide all of the right-hand side variables by the number of 
employees in the same year. 
 
2In the companion paper, we estimate the actual equation (1), i.e. with employment in 
year t on the left-hand side and lagged employment, i.e. employment in year t-1, on 
the right-hand side. The results obtained from estimating this model are in line with 
those from the logit estimations. In particular, we find exactly the same results for the 
three indicator variables. 
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INTERVIEWS 
1. Interview with Janet Williamson, TUC, London, January 2009. At the time of the 
interview, Williamson was the TUC Senior Policy Officer responsible for policy on 
institutional investment, corporate governance and corporate social responsibility 
2. Interview with Anonymous Respondent Linked to Private Equity Industry, 
London, November, 2008 (anonymous 2008) 
3. Interview with Maria Ludkin, GMB, London, November 2008. At the time of the 
interview, Ludkin was the GMB legal officer who led the GMB evidence to the Treasury 
Select Committee in its enquiry into the private equity industry. 
4. Interview with David Hall, PSIRU, London, November 2008. The Public Service 
International Research Unit has conducted extensive practice orientated research on 
the role of private equity in privatized utilities.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the 105 target firms and the 105 control firms 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of private equity acquisitions, i.e. the acquired firms, in Panel A and the control sample 
matched by performance in the pre-acquisitions year in Panel B. Remuneration over employees is the ratio of total wages and salaries in £000s to 
the annual average number of employees. Turnover over employees is the ratio of company turnover in £000s to the annual average number of 
employees. +++ stands for significance at the 1% level for the test for the difference in proportions between the acquired firms and the control firms. * 
and ** stand for significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively, for the t-test for the difference in means between the acquired firms and the 
control firms. o, oo and ooo stand for significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively, for the sign rank test for the difference in medians 
between acquired firms and control firms. 
  
Year relative to acquisition 
year (year 0) 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 
Panel A: Sample of private equity acquisitions 
Proportion of firms with 
decrease in employment 
0.27 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.41 0.59+++ 0.48 0.47 0.55 
Remuneration 
over employees 
Average 21.76 24.48 25.65 27.46 29.27 27.94 30.40** 30.23** 33.12** 
Median 16.30 18.94 19.97 20.10 21.52 22.39 25.87o 24.75oo 27.88oo 
Turnover over 
employees 
Average 104.60 120.69 119.90 125.79** 130.44** 131.15 149.57* 149.38** 163.39** 
Median 59.16oo 65.74oo 70.67ooo 74.71ooo 77.43ooo 91.07oo 101.45oo 99.09ooo 101.64ooo 
Panel B: Control sample 
Proportion of firms with a 
decrease in employment 
0.39 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.41 0.51 0.47 
Remuneration 
over employees 
Average 22.38 22.99 26.27 28.51 30.89 33.81 37.15 39.23 42.86 
Median 18.33 18.97 20.11 21.75 23.17 25.93 26.83 29.75 31.04 
Turnover over 
employees 
Average 119.80 115.45 117.52 146.10 161.22 181.82 219.27 238.66 252.14 
Median 91.52 89.50 89.66 93.20 101.77 110.96 112.16 136.74 143.25 
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Table 2: Logistic Regressions Explaining Likelihood of Downsizing 
 
The dependent variable is set to if there is a decrease in the average number of employees in year t relative to year t-1, and zero otherwise. Log 
(Remuneration over Employees) is the logarithm of the ratio of total wages and salaries in £000s to the annual average number of employees 
both measured in year t. Log (Turnover over Employees) is the logarithm of the ratio of company turnover in £000s to the annual average 
number of employees both measured in year t. Acquired Firm is an indicator variable which equals one if the firm is a private equity target, and 
zero otherwise. Post Acquisition is an indicator variable which is set to one for all firm-year observations following the year of the acquisition. 
Post Acquisition * Acquired Firm is the interaction of the previous two indicator variables. All regressions include industry dummies as well as 
year dummies (not reported in the table). The figures in parentheses are the z-statistics. *, ** and *** stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log (Remuneration over Employeest) 0.938*** 
(2.77) 
0.974*** 
(2.87) 
0.974*** 
(2.86) 
0.968***  
(2.85) 
Log (Remuneration over Employeest-1) -0.883*** 
(-2.60) 
-0.877*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.867** 
(-2.55) 
-0.867** 
(-2.55) 
Log (Turnover over Employeest) 0.805*** 
(3.13) 
0.776*** 
(3.00) 
0.791*** 
(3.05) 
0.797*** 
(3.08) 
Log (Turnover over Employeest-1) -0.843*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.829*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.848*** 
(-3.29) 
-0.851*** 
(-3.31) 
Acquired Firm 0.131 
(1.16) 
0.144 
(1.26) 
-0.061 
(-0.42) 
-0.081 
(-0.59) 
Post Acquisition  0.287* 
(1.85) 
0.0670 
(0.36) 
 
Post Acquisition x Acquired Firm   0.508** 
(2.23) 
0.552*** 
(2.87) 
Constant 0.140 
(0.18) 
0.048 
(0.06) 
0.132 
(0.17) 
0.155 
(0.20) 
N 1522 1522 1522 1522 
Pseudo R2 0.072 0.073 0.076 0.076 
Wald Chi2 147.5 150.9 155.9 155.8 
Degrees of freedom 31 32 33 32 
 
